The Discourse Principle

[Michael Allan]

Hi Ned,

> (This email begins a series of threads that will branch off from the
> original thread: *Legitimation in Votorola Practice*.)

Please give an example of where the practice (validity seeking) fails
to serve its claimed purpose. I still think this is a good idea,
because otherwise you're in the awkward position of elaborating a
theory of how the practice is broken, when you cannot imagine a single
case in which it fails to guide the text closer to validity, as
claimed.  http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/validity_seeking

Mike


Ned Conner said:
> (This email begins a series of threads that will branch off from the 
> original thread: *Legitimation in Votorola Practice*.)
> 
>     D. Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected
>     persons could agree as participants in rational discourses. 
> 
> The Discourse Principle (D) specifies (proposes) the criterion that 
> renders an action norm valid.
> 
> The criterion is *NOT* that any particular group of individuals actually 
> *DOES* agree. The criterion is that *ALL* possibly affected persons 
> *COULD* agree.
> 
> One can appreciate the wisdom of stating the principle in this way when 
> one considers, for example, that for a great many action norms, future 
> generations yet unborn are included in the set of "all possibly affected 
> persons". In large populations, it seldom happens that the set of actual 
> participants in each particular decision comprises the full set of "all 
> possibly affected persons".
> 
> A vote count can only establish an action norm as valid if the vote 
> count includes votes from "all possibly affected persons". In instances 
> in which the set of actual participants does not include all possibly 
> affected persons, the vote count is irrelevant in establishing the 
> validity of the proposal. (If 300 Neocons in Washington D.C. unanimously 
> agree to bomb Libya, the unanimity of the vote count does not render the 
> action norm valid.)
> 
> The key difference between "agreeing as voters" and "agreeing as 
> participants in rational discourses" is this:
> 
>     * In voting, the vote count makes the decision.
>     * In rational discourse, the "last reason standing" (not
>       successfully rebutted) makes the decision.
> 
> Habermas is very careful to specify that the agreements must be "as 
> participants in rational discourses". Just as Habermas suggests, the 
> best that we (decision participants) can do in instances involving 
> non-participating stakeholders is to try our best to **provisionally** 
> decide whether the action norm is valid *through rational discourse*. 
> (Absent the participation of all stakeholders, we can never know for sure.)