Autonomy in immortal reason: a philosophic argument
Michael Allan
mike at zelea.com
Thu Dec 12 11:23:01 EST 2013
I post for the record. I didn't intend to write a moral philosophy,
but that's what I ended up with, though only a sketchy outline of it.
I don't yet know if it's sound, or original. It could be interesting
if it is, because nearly all it depends on is the speed of light and a
valuation on reason. Strangely I think it's possible to derive both
individual rights and collective responsibilities from that.
Mike
The last section ended:
Personal and collective autonomy differ therefore in this regard:
although both are defined as self-legislation against contingency,
the former is tied to a *morality* that is everywhere within
immediate reach, while the latter is tied to an *immortality* that
is reached only through an enterprise of epic proportions, if at
all. It is difficult to avoid speculation that these two
autonomies are related in some fundamental way. The next section
will attempt to trace the relations.
Autonomy in immortal reason: a philosophic argument
----------------------------------------------------------------------
http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/nMy#Autonomy_in_immortal_reason:_a_philosophic_argument
A morality that purposes immortality
------------------------------------
Here I argue that morality might have a purpose in the immortality of
rational being. I ground the argument in physical laws and a
valuation on reason. From these I deduce the broad shape of an ethics
that asserts a collective end by means of individual rights. I
briefly relate it to the practices elaborated in the preceding
sections, and the ethics of Kant.
(CiL) Let all communications be limited to light speed.
Foremost among the physical laws assumed are those underlying the
prohibition on superluminal motion. If the prohibition holds, then
long travel times will prevent even a self-made extinction (AxP), such
as a catastrophic war, from communicating with any force across
interstellar distances. Extinction events will be spatially bound to
individual star systems.
(XiL) Extinction events (NxP, AxP) are locally isolated.
So the universal extinction of a dispersed life form would require a
coincidence of near-simultaneous extinctions across all stellar
locales. The likelihood of this declines steeply as the number of
locales increases.
(XdSm) Mortality declines exponentially with stellar dispersal.
[GM] Grounding morality
(m0w) Morality purposes the immortality of rational being as
| a whole
|
+- (m0) Morality purposes the immortality of rational being
| |
| +- (IiP) The immortality of rational being (e1) is possible
| | |
| | +- (see PrC in outline OYA)
| | http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/nMy#OYA
| | |
| | +- (XdSm) *Mortality* declines exponentially with
| | | stellar dispersal
| | |
| | +- (XiL) Extinction events (NxP, AxP) are locally
| | | isolated
| | |
| | +- (CiL) Let all communications be limited to
| | light speed
| |
| +- (XcR) The *mortality* of rational being curtails reason
| | |
| | +- (XcR2) Let that endless extinction and recurrence (e2)
| | | would curtail reason
| | |
| | +- (XcR1) Let that final extinction (e3) would curtail
| | reason
| |
| +- (MiR) Let morality be rational
| |
| +- (RiV) Let reason be the supreme value
|
+- (WmP) Let immortality be more certain in the whole than in
the part
Life that disperses across interstellar space may thereby avoid
extinction and attain immortality. This much was already argued; see
PrC in outline OYA. It follows:
(IiP) The immortality of rational being (e1) is possible.
By "immortality" I mean an endless continuum. Local extinctions might
still occur in this or that star system, but the continuum of rational
being would remain unbroken because other local populations would
continue to exist, to develop, to intercommunicate, and to spread
(PcF). Thus rational being would live forever in this continuum.
http://zelea.com/project/autonomy/wiki/v/p/nMy/3E.png
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[3E] Three eternities. The three alternative fates for rational
being as a whole, one of which must hold for all time.
The alternatives are those of mortality: either a discontinuity of
endless extinction and recurrence; or a final extinction. One of
these three (e1, e2 or e3) is the eternal fate for rational being as a
whole.
(XcR2) Let that endless extinction and recurrence (e2) would curtail
reason.
(XcR3) Let that final extinction (e3) would curtail reason.
A total discontinuity in rational being (e2 or e3) would cut short the
development of reason. Even if intelligent life tends naturally to
arise in the cosmos (e2), each incarnation would have to restart its
development from scratch, only to have it extinguished once again. So
the mortality of rational being (as a whole) curtails reason.
(XcR) The mortality of rational being curtails reason.
(MiR) Let *morality* be rational.
(RiV) Let reason be the supreme value.
Assume that morality works according to reason, so it is possible to
make sense of morality. Assume further that reason is the supreme
good for us; if pressed, we would sacrifice anything to save reason.
Then knowing that *mortality* curtails reason, while immortality is
held out as an alternative (IiP), it follows that morality must reach
for the latter.
(m0) Morality purposes the immortality of rational being.
(WmP) Let immortality be more certain in the whole than in the part.
It hinders an endeavour to burden it with conditions. An immortality
that is conditional on a particular species, for example, is less
certain than one that is broader. The broadest and most certain of
all is an endless continuum of rational being *regardless* of the
continuity of its parts; i.e. immortality of the whole. This
therefore is the goal. To make it explicit:
(m0w) Morality purposes the immortality of rational being as
a whole.
That appears to be the ethical substance in the conjunction of a
supreme valuation on reason (RiV) and the known structure of the
cosmos (CiL). The remainder of this section traces its formal
outlines, then briefly relates the whole both to the practices
elaborated in the preceding sections, and the ethics of Kant.
[TFM] Tracing the form of morality
(m2) Morality promotes a maximum of personal freedom compatible
| with equal freedoms for all
|
| (m1) Morality relates personal action to a universally
| | collective end
| |
| +- (m0w) Morality purposes the immortality of rational being
| | | as a whole
| | |
| | +- (see outline GM)
| |
| +- (IdA) Let the immortality of rational being depend on
| personal action
|
+- (AiU) Let it be unknown which actions are helpful to the
| collective end
|
+- (AnH) Let no action that is harmless to freedom be harmful to
the collective end
(IdA) Let the immortality of rational being depend on personal
action.
It might happen that we become immortal without raising a finger, but
that is unlikely. More likely it will require personal agency. This
is why we invited morality to the argument in the first place, of
course, because we know that morality regulates personal behaviour.
Add what we since learned, that morality also purposes the immortality
of rational being as a whole m0w, and a shape begins to emerge:
(m1) Morality relates personal action to a universally
collective end.
I do not intend here to formulate any moral principles, only to
roughly trace the ethical architecture in which moral principles may
be fitted, and to recall its purpose. The architecture spans a
collective dimension because reason develops and reproduces in social
spaces, not in any particular individual. It extends the span
universally because anything less would raise the risk of ultimate
failure (WmP). The stakes are high because a chancier, bounded
construction might lead, for all we can ever know, to a universe that
is forever devoid of reason (e3).
(AiU) Let it be unknown which actions are helpful to the
collective end.
(AnH) Let no action that is harmless to freedom be harmful to the
collective end.
While success depends on personal action (IdA), we cannot know in
advance which particular actions are necessary. The goal is too
distant and the eventualities too complex to judge with certainty.
But people are numerous. They can explore many paths simultaneously;
so that, if a given action does not reduce anyone's freedom to act,
then it can hardly reduce the likelihood of ultimate success. Success
depends on opportune discoveries to which the formal theory is blind.
Therefore the optimum strategy for the blind strategist is to maximize
everyone's freedom of action.
(m2) Morality promotes a maximum of personal freedom compatible
with equal freedoms for all.
Anything less would again increase the risk of failure and an
irrecoverable loss of the highest value (RiV). The tipping points
between success and failure are many, and each hinges on the freedom
of an individual whose identity is unknown. Like the collectively
oriented span, therefore, the span of individual rights is designed to
bridge a tremendous void of uncertainty and risk.
These formal assertions (m1, m2) abstract a universalized space
without specific content or end. We might value a different end than
reason (RiV), yet meet it with the same formal contruction. The end
is specified only in the material assertion (m0). All three
assertions (m0, m1, m2) are theoretical, but they correspond roughly
to the practices described in the preceding sections. Table MTP
summarizes the correspondence:
[MTP] Moral theory and practice.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
| Theory | Practice
-------+---------------------------+-------------------------------
form | (m2) Morality promotes a | Personal freedom:
| maximum of personal | a subjective argument
| freedom compatible | [1]
| with equal freedoms |
| for all |
| |
form | (m1) Morality relates | (NpY) Collective autonomy:
| personal action to | a methodological
| a universally | argument [2]
| collective end |
| |
matter | (m0) Morality purposes | Autonomy in immortality:
| the immortality of | a mythic argument [3]
| rational being |
The meaning latent in the material theory and practice is finally
conveyed in the aesthetics of myth. In short, it holds out the
assurance of an ultimate safe haven for the development of reason.
Kant was born into that assurance, while we are not, and this loss
separates us from the Enlightenment and its thought [4]. I hope the
prospect of its eventual replacement may be regarded as complementary
to the lost original. Meanwhile, the assertion of personal freedom
and equality (m2) should forestall any formal conflict with Kantian
ethics.
The autonomy of being in reason
-------------------------------
This section is undrafted. But I attach figure RAC in case anyone is
reading this. It helped me to orient my thoughts.
http://zelea.com/project/autonomy/wiki/v/p/nMy/RAC.png
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[RAC] Relations of autonomy and contingency. Illustrating the
causal relations of autonomy (black arrows) and contingency
(red).
http://zelea.com/project/autonomy/wiki/v/p/nMy/BM.png
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[BM] Bookends of modernity. Illustrating a view of 21st-century
mythopoeia as opposed and complementary to the Enlightenment.
Notes
-----
Kan85 Immanuel Kant. 1785. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
Translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann, 2012. Cambridge
University Press. http://books.google.ca/books?id=qfyKv1a-lPAC
[1] http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/nMy#Personal_freedom:_a_subjective_argument
[2] http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/nMy#Collective_autonomy:_a_methodological_argument
[3] http://zelea.com/w/Stuff:Votorola/p/nMy#Autonomy_in_immortality:_a_mythic_argument
[4] Personally, faced with the inevitability of my own death while
the future runs on to eternity, I feel cheated by an ethics
that finds closure in the present. The open streams of the
past and the future hold all that I cherish, and fear to lose.
While I cannot fault the formal principle of treating myself
and others each as an absolute end, nor can I see the actual
truth of it [5]. I don't want to be an end in myself, and
taken literally that end would be hell to me. I think the
"moral law" is incomplete unless it simultaneously looks to the
"starry heavens". Not having that latter conflation is what
separates me from Kant's age.
[5] Here I refer to the second formulation of the principle, "So
act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never
merely as a means." [6] This formulation is saying "that a
rational being, as an end according to its nature, and hence as
an end in itself, must serve for every maxim as the limiting
condition of all merely relative and arbitrary ends". [7]
[6] Kan85, 4:429
[7] Kan85, 4:436
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