Vote mirroring as a counter-monopoly measure in the provision of participatory democracy
Michael Allan
mike at zelea.com
Thu Jul 28 10:18:35 EDT 2011
Can anyone find a flaw in this argument? Does it make sense? I want
to post it to a larger list for comment. If it can stand up to
critique, then I think it points to a safer path of development.
VOTE MIRRORING AS A COUNTER-MONOPOLY MEASURE IN THE PROVISION OF
PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY [1]
Vote mirroring is arguably a sufficient measure in itself to preclude
the formation of a monopoly in the provision of online participatory
democracy. A vote mirror can unilaterally interconnect the voters of
multiple service sites into a single "inter-network" of participation
and thus reduce the network effects that might contribute to the
dominance of a single provider. Social media in general is prone to
monopolies, but their formation is not inevitable [2]. By posing an
early challenge, vote mirroring can level the playing field and
preclude a monopoly in voting services.
Vote mirroring works by copying votes from service sites
(vote-servers), and reproducing them as images at another site (the
mirror) [3]. The technique is illustrated in the figure below. The
top half shows three vote-servers together with a sample of their
votes. Servers A and C are providing communicative services in which
votes are delegated transitively, while server B is providing a
conventional mass service [4].
| |
A | B | C
| |
| |
(0) | | (0) (0)
(0) | | | (0) | 1 /
\ 1 | 1 | | \ | / 1
\ | | | \ 1 | /
(0) (0) \ | | | \ | / (0) (0)
\ 1 | \| | (0) | \ |/ | 1 /
\ | 1 (2) | (0) | | (3) | / 1
\ | | | \ 1 | 1 (0) | | | /
\| | 3 | \ | / | | 4 |/
(2) | | \ | / 1 | | (2)
\ 3 | | \ | / | (0) | / (0)
\ | (0) | (6)----(0) | \ 1 | / |
\ | / | 1 / \ 1 | \ | / (0) | 1
\ | / 1 | / \ | \ | / 3 \ |
\|/ | (0) 1 \ | \|/ 1 \|
(7) | (0) | (8) (2)
| |
--------------------+--------------------+------------------------
(0) D (0) (0)
(0) | (0) | 1 /
\ 1 | 1 \ | / 1
\ | \ 1 | /
(0) (0) \ | \ | / (0) (0)
\ 1 | \| (0) \ |/ | 1 /
\ | 1 (2) (0) | (3) | / 1
\ | | \ 1 | 1 (0) | | /
\| | 3 \ | / | 4 |/
(2) | \ | / 1 | (2)
\ 3 | \ | / (0) | / (0)
\ | (0) (6)----(0) \ 1 | / |
\ | / 1 / \ 1 \ | / 3 (0) | 1
\ | / 1 / \ \ | / \ |
\|/ (0) 1 \ \|/ 1 \|
(7) (0) (8) (2)
FIG 1. Vote mirroring. Three separate vote servers (A, B, C) and
a mirror that reproduces the votes of all three on a single
server (D).
The mirror (bottom) reproduces the votes of all three servers. This
involves translating the votes from their various native formats on
the original servers into the single format used on the mirror.
Voting methods can differ greatly, so translation may entail a degree
of information loss. This can make for an imperfect image. The
imperfections cannot invalidate the overall technique, however,
because an imperfect image is a better reflection of reality than no
image at all. For example, knowing that these particular votes
(figure above) all concern a single issue, the mirror has represented
the four end-candidates as rivals (with 7, 6, 8 and 2 votes
respectively), which gives a truer picture of the options available to
the voters.
USES OF A MIRROR
----------------
This section concerns the direct uses of vote mirroring by a
participant. The table below summarizes these for different
categories of participant together with the associated costs and
benefits. Of the four uses shown, three are of benefit to the users
of any voting service, while the fourth is of benefit to users of mass
voting services in particular.
Table 1. Uses, costs and benefits for different categories of
participant.
Use of original vote server Use of mirror
============================== ==================================
SERVICE PARTICIPANT USE COST BENEFIT
TYPE ROLE (if any)
======= =========== ========== ============ =====================
Any Candidate Soliciting Overview of voters,
votes Overview of rivals
----------- ---------- ------------ ---------------------
Voter Comparing Overview of
candidates candidates
---------- ------------ ---------------------
Voting User Convenience
registration
------- ----------- ---------- ------------ ---------------------
Mass Trailing Delegation User Visibility to voters,
candidate registration Viability as
candidate
==================================================================
Soliciting votes
----------------
A mirror can be used by a candidate as a tool for soliciting votes.
It provides two benefits for this purpose: an overview of all the
voters in a single interface, and a similar overview of the rival
candidates (compare top and bottom in figure 1). Seeing all the
voters is particularly beneficial, because online voting tends to be a
continuous process in which the voters are free to shift their votes.
Comparing candidates
--------------------
A mirror can be used by voters as a tool for comparing candidates.
The benefit it provides for this purpose is an overview of all
candidates, together with the "live" structure of their voter support.
Only a mirror can provide such an overview.
Voting
------
A mirror will typically provide a voting service of its own, making it
a combined mirror and vote-server. This is a convenience for any
voter who uses the mirroring service to compare candidates and then
wishes to shift his vote. Rather than having to register as a user on
the candidate's home vote-server, he simply registers on whatever
mirror/vote-server he prefers. He can then shift his vote to any
candidate.
Delegation
----------
A mirror can provide a delegation service to a candidate on a mass
voting site, where it would otherwise be unavailable. This may be
particularly useful to a candidate who is trailing in votes, as it
increases both her visibility and viability. A new voter will often
explore upstream and inspect the supporting structure of votes before
deciding where to place his own vote. A candidate who presents
herself in that context is more likely to receive a vote than one who
appears as number 29 (or 229) in an ordered list.
| |
A | B | C
| |
| |
(0) | | (0) (0)
(0) | | | (0) | 1 /
\ 1 | 1 | | \ | / 1
\ | | | \ 1 | /
(0) (0) \ | | | \ | / (0) (0)
\ 1 | \| | (0) | \ |/ | 1 /
\ | 1 (2) | (0) | | (3) | / 1
\ | | | \ 1 | 1 (0) | | | /
\| | 3 | \ | / | | 4 |/
(2) | | \ | / 1 | | (2)
\ 3 | | \ | / | (0) | / (0)
\ | (0) | (6)----(0) | \ 1 | / |
\ | / | 1 / \ 1 | \ | / 3 (0) | 1
\ | / 1 | / \ | \ | / \ |
\|/ | (0) 1 \ | \|/ 1 \|
(8)----(0) | (0) | (8) (2)
1 | |
| |
-----------------------+--------------------+------------------------
(0) D (0) (0)
(0) | (0) | 1 /
\ 1 | 1 \ | / 1
\ | \ 1 | /
(0) (0) \ | \ | / (0) (0)
\ 1 | \| \ |/ | 1 /
\ | 1 (2) (3) | / 1
\ | | | | /
\| | 3 | 4 |/
(2) | (0) | (2)
\ 3 | (0) | (0) | / (0)
\ | (0) \ 1 | 1 (0) \ 1 | / |
\ | / \ | / \ | / 3 (0) | 1
\ | / 1 \ | / 1 \ | / \ |
\|/ 7 \ | / \|/ 1 \|
(14)------------(6)----(0) (8) (2)
1 / \ 1
/ \
(0) 1 \
(0)
FIG 2. Cross-server delegation in a mirror. A candidate on mass
server B has cast a vote using communicative server A.
Mirror D recognizes this as delegation and carries the 6 votes of
the first candidate to the second candidate for a total of 14.
Note that up to three servers are involved. A delegate is both a
candidate and a voter. Here the role of candidate is provided by the
mass server (B) on which the delegate continues to receive her
original votes, while that of voter is provided by the second server
(A) on which she casts her own vote. The third server (D) is the
mirror that combines both roles and reveals her as a delegate. If the
mirror were to provide its own voting service as well, then it would
be more convenient to cast the delegating vote there directly.<ref>In
that case, the total for the end candidate on A would have remained 7.
It would be incorrect in any case, as the results calculated on all
non-mirroring servers (A, B, C) are incomplete. None of them takes
into account the full set of votes on the issue.</ref>
COUNTER-MONOPOLY EFFECTS OF MIRRORING
-------------------------------------
If the benefits outlined above are roughly accurate, then the
counter-monopoly effects are clear. Votes will shift in favour of
preferred candidates regardless of their home servers. Users will
tend to migrate to those servers that provide a convenient combination
of both mirroring and voting services, rather than relocating with
each vote shift. But any vote-server is capable of hosting a
mirroring service and sharing equally in the full extent of voter
participation. A new server without any actual users, for example,
would still have all the voters. This is not an advantage that could
easily be dispensed with. Network effects are likely therefore to
entrench vote mirroring as a practice. With that, no imbalance in the
distribution of users could ever tilt over into a monopoly [5].
Table 2. Non-defences against mirroring.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Defence Why it is likely to fail
---------------------- ------------------------------------------
Copyright Non-creative factual information is exempt
Closing data APIs Data scraped from user interfaces
Opaque client platform There is none, all can legally be hacked
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright
---------
This defence is ineffective because non-creative, factual information
is generally exempt from copyright protection. A vote conveys the
simple fact of assent or agreement, and people are free to inform
others of that fact.
Closing data APIs
-----------------
Closing the data APIs is an ineffective defence, because the data
necessary for vote mirroring can instead be scraped from a user
interface. This defence would have to be combined with an opaque
client platform (below) in order to be effective.
Opaque client platform
----------------------
This defence is ineffective because no such platform exists. The only
opaque platforms with sufficent coverage to support a monopoly bid are
Flash and Java, both of which have open source implementations on the
client side [6]. An open source client can always be hacked and
internally scraped.
Table 3. Defences against mirroring.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Defence Cost
---------------------- ------------------------------------------
Secret ballot Lower credibility of results,
De-socializing the medium
------------------------------------------------------------------
Secret ballot
-------------
In this defence, the identity of the voter is kept hidden. This is
effective because votes cannot accurately be imaged without knowing
the voters' identities. One of the costs associated with this defence
is a lower credibility of results. Methods of verifying private votes
exist, but none is so simple and credible as the full disclosure of
public voting.
Another cost is the de-socializing of the medium. This is more
serious, because the social attractions of a medium are largely
eliminated if the participants can no longer identify each other. It
is unclear therefore how this defence could be reconciled with a
competitive strategy, especially when the goal is a monopoly.
CONCLUSION
----------
There is no viable defence against vote mirroring. The immediate
effects of mirroring are sufficient in themselves to prevent the
formation of a monopoly of voting services.
[1] The working draft of this essay is posted at
http://zelea.com/w/User:Mike-ZeleaCom/Vote_mirroring_as_a_counter-monopoly_measure
[2] Public telephone networks are an example of a social media
monopoly. Online examples are Twitter, Facebook and Skype.
Email is a counter example.
[3] Vote mirroring is the invention of Thomas von der Elbe. See the
original description:
http://zelea.com/w/User:ThomasvonderElbe_GmxDe/Vote_mirroring
[4] On the distiction between communicative and mass voting, see:
http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht#medium
[5] Crucially vote mirroring unbinds the role of participant from
that of user. Only the former is subject to network effects,
and unbound it can no longer reinforce an imbalance in the
latter. A user is free to choose her own vote-server based on
quality of service, but that choice will not affect the fact of
her broader participation and thereby the choices of others.
[6] Java itself is open source. For Flash clients, there is
Lightspark. http://sourceforge.net/apps/trac/lightspark
--
Michael Allan
Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
http://zelea.com/
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