[MG] [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish

[Paul Nollen]

Hi Kristofer,

I answer in between

Kind regards

Paul

-----Original Message----- 
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Sent: Monday, March 18, 2013 11:00 AM
To: Paul Nollen
Cc: Metagovernment Project ; Meinungsfindungstool ; Votorola ; Comunicación 
; Election Methods ; AG Liquid Democracy
Subject: Re: [MG] [EM] Helping the Pirate Party to vanish

On 03/18/2013 09:58 AM, Paul Nollen wrote:
> Liquid democracy is tested for many years in every big (and small)
> corporation. It is unthinkable that shareholders have the obligation to
> give their voice for more than one General assembly to anyone. Every
> shareholder can vote for himself or appoint a representative at his
> choice only for that dedicated General Assembly. This system of "liquid
> democracy" is proven over many years all around the world.
> It is only in politics that voters are forced to give a mandate for many
> years for decissions unknown.

The way I understand liquid democracy (and correct me if I'm wrong),
people can give their votes to proxies, and these proxies can in turn
give their votes to other proxies;

- Multiple proxies is, or has to be, an option.  There is nowhare any rule 
that liquid democracy has to allow indirect proxy.

whereas in corporations, the proxying
happens only once. That is, either you vote or you say "X will vote for me".

(I imagine that if indirect proxying had been possible in corporations,
we'd heard more about cycles. But again, I could be wrong. I've never
been to a general assembly.)

Also, for corporations in general, there are arguments that the real
power resides as much with the board as the assembly. This is given as
an explanation for the weird incentive structures that often appear,
with enormous bonuses given to executives even when the companies
struggle or fail. The recent Swiss Minder referendum can be seen in that
light.

In effect, that argument goes that the board can more effectively
exercise power than the general assembly can counter it, so the real
decisions are made by the board. If this is true, then having a more
corporate system in the political domain may not be such a good thing.

- I only stated that "liquid democracy" existed as a system already for a 
long time.

On the other hand, perhaps the boards are powerful only because the
general assembly meets so infrequently. As an imperfect analogy: "you
can accomplish lots of things even in a prison if the guards only look
on you once every year". And if *that*'s the reason, then liquid
democracy could work in a political setting - at least for advisory
purposes.

- That depend of the corporation ofcourse. I can imagine that in a 
cooperative like Mondragon the situation is different than in, let's say for 
example, General Motors.
- if people are not granted decisive power it doesn't interest me, but that 
is my personal opinion of course.

I also note that vote-buying would make less sense in a corporation
since voting power is given by wealth, in terms of numbers of shares
held, in the first place. And then I wonder if there have been instances
of vote coercion on shareholders.

- yes, in corporations it is not "one man one vote" but that is another 
issue.


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